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Abstract
I show that the central notion of Constructive Empiricism, empirical
adequacy, can be expressed syntactically and specifically in the Received
View of the logical empiricists. The formalization shows that the Received
View is superior to Constructive Empiricism in the treatment of theories
involving unobservable objects or functions from observable to unobserv-
able objects. It also suggests a formalization of ‘full empirical informative-
ness’ in Constructive Empiricism.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Two accounts of the relation between theory and observation 3
3 Syntactic empirical adequacy 6
4 Empirical adequacy in a bipartitioned vocabulary 7
5 Beyond empirical substructures 9
6 Beyond consistency 11
7 Conclusion 12
∗Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. se-
bastian.lutz@gmx.net. Early versions of this article have been presented at the Lunch Talk of the
Theoretical Philosophy Unit at Utrecht University and at the PhDs in Logic conference at Ghent
University in 2009. I thank the audiences, the audience at the Twenty-Third Biennial Meeting of
the Philosophy of Science Association, and Thomas Müller for helpful discussions. Research for this
article was in part supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
Sebastian Lutz Empirical Adequacy in the Received View—Preprint
1 Introduction
The so-called Received View in the philosophy of science (rv), developed by the
logical empiricists and especially by Carnap and Hempel, assumes the formaliza-
tion of scientific theories in predicate logic and a bipartition of the non-logical
vocabulary into observational and theoretical terms. While it was never gener-
ally accepted (Richardson 2007, 362–365), it suffered a complete fall from grace
(and then some) in the second half of the 20th century (cf. Lutz 2012, §1). Only re-
cently have there been defenses of Carnap’s general philosophical method (Carus
2007, Maher 2007, Lutz 2009, Justus 2012) and of the use of predicate logic or
more generally syntactic means for the analysis of scientific theories (Halvorson
2012; 2013, Lutz 2014). The rv itself, however, has so far mainly seen historical
defenses (Mormann 2007, Lutz 2012). It is the aim of this article to provide a con-
ceptual defense relative to one of its main competitors, Constructive Empiricism
(ce) (van Fraassen 1980). Specifically, I will argue that the relation between the-
ory and observations that is described in the ce-formalism can also be described
in the rv-formalism, while the converse does not hold.
The only previous defense of the rv-formalism relative to ce (Friedman 1982,
276–277) consists of a valuable, but very short outline of an argument and fur-
thermore assumes a restriction to first order logic. Other relative defenses have fo-
cused on syntactic approaches in general (Worrall 1984, §2; Turney 1990). Turney
provides the technically most elaborate defense. After proving the equivalence of
van Fraassen’s notion of embedding and his syntactic notion of implanting (un-
der specific assumptions), he concludes (Turney 1990, 448–449):
I agree with van Fraassen, that the positivist account does not yield
good definitions for empirical equivalence and empirical adequacy.
However, I do not agree with his claim that this is because the posi-
tivist account is syntactic, while his is semantic. [ . . . ] The relevant
distinction here [ . . . ] is between two ways of linking theory and
observation: Correspondence rules versus embedding/implanting.
Turney provides a detailed argument for the equivalence of his syntactic and van
Fraassen’s semantic account, but that van Fraassen’s embeddings are an improve-
ment over correspondence rules remains a conjecture.
To disprove Turney’s (and van Fraassen’s) conjecture, I will provide a defi-
nition of the rv-formalism and a definition of the formal core of ce, empirical
adequacy. The latter is in conflict with Turney’s definition, which I will show to
be inadequate (§2). Next, I will provide a syntactic description of empirical ade-
quacy (§3), which forms the basis for a description of empirical adequacy on the
basis of correspondence rules (§4). This, then, shows that whatever the relation
between theory and observations is, it can be described in the ce-formalism only
if it can be described in the rv-formalism. The converse does not hold without
significantly rewriting scientific theories, however, and I show that this puts ce
at a disadvantage (§5). Finally, I give a precise description of a problem pointed
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out by Worrall (1984, §3) and show how it can be solved in ce by taking a cue
from the rv.
2 Two accounts of the relation between theory and ob-
servation
Like the ce-formalism, the rv-formalism provides a framework for analyzing sci-
entific theories and their relation to observations. The most important recon-
structions of theories and most important tools developed in the rv assume
a formalization of theories in higher order predicate logic with a vocabulary
V = {Pi ,F j , ck : i ∈ I , j ∈ J ,k ∈ K} of distinct symbols, where each ck is an
object symbol and each Pi and F j is a relation symbol or, respectively, function
symbol of a specific arity and type. Formal model theory is used for the def-
inition of logical entailment (Lutz 2012, 83). What distinguishes the rv from
syntactic approaches in general is the assumed bipartition of the non-logical vo-
cabulary V of a theory into a set O of observation terms and a set T of theoret-
ical terms.1 This bipartition leads to a natural tripartition of the set of sentences
into O -sentences, T -sentences, and correspondence rules, the latter of which are
sentences containing both O - and T -terms (Carnap 1966, ch. 24).
Definition 1. An rv-theoryΘ is the union of a setΠ of higher order T -sentences
(the postulates of the theory) and a set Γ of higher order V -sentences (the corre-
spondence rules).
Sentences in the extended observation language can be of any order. This is,
for example, assumed by Carnap’s explication of a theory’s synthetic component
as its Ramsey sentence (Carnap 1963, §24.D).
Definition 2. Observations are given by a set of higher order O -sentences.
The moniker ‘observations’ is of course somewhat misleading, but it will be
convenient in the following. What is important is that sets of O -sentences are, in
a sense, completely interpreted (cf. Carnap 1963, §24.A).
In contradistinction to the rv, the ce-formalism relies on model theory. Van
Fraassen (1980, 64) describes it as follows:
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models;
and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observ-
able phenomena.
Furthermore the models of the theory “are describable only up to structural
isomorphism” (van Fraassen 2008, 238; cf. 2002, 22). More formally, this can be
phrased as follows:
1Following standard terminology in the philosophy of science (but unfortunately not in logic),
I use ‘term’ synonymously with ‘non-logical symbol’.
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Definition 3. A ce-theory

{Tn}n∈N ,{En}n∈N contains a family of struc-
tures (the models of the theory) and for each structure Tn =
D
Tn ,P
Tn
i ,F
Tn
j ,
cTn
k
E
i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn
a set En of empirical substructures, such that for each E ∈ En ,
E ⊆ Tn .2 With each model, a theory also contains every isomorphic structure
and its corresponding3 empirical substructures.
Here and in the following, Tn := |Tn |. As a shorthand, define furthermore

Tn ,En

:=

{Tn}n∈N ,{En}n∈N. Definition 3 uses a standard formalization of
the notion of a structure (Chang and Keisler 1990, 19–20; Hodges 1993, 2). Van
Fraassen (1989, 366, n. 4) objects to structures being “yolked to a particular syn-
tax”, as in “many standard logic texts”, which suggests that he would prefer a
definition phrased in the formalism of Bell and Machover (1977, 164), who use
an index set instead of a vocabulary. This difference is little more than notational,
however, since in their definitions of further model theoretic concepts, the index
set plays the role of the vocabulary. For examples relevant in the following, com-
pare the definitions of reduct (or “reduction”), isomorphism, and substructure
by Bell and Machover (1977, 164–165) and by Chang and Keisler (1990, 20–23),
respectively (cf. Lutz 2014, §3). A reader preferring Bell and Machover’s notation
will have no problems adapting the following discussion.
Strictly distinguishing between the observable and unobservable objects, van
Fraassen (1980, 64) suggests describing observable phenomena by structures as
well: “The structures which can be described in experimental and measurement
reports we can call appearances” (cf. van Fraassen 2008, 286). This suggests
Definition 4. Appearances are given by a set A of structures such that the do-
main of each A ∈ A contains only observable objects. A structure A ∈ A is an
appearance.
Note that the set of appearances does not have to be closed under isomor-
phism.
In early works van Fraassen (1970, §3) relies on “elementary statements” and
a “satisfaction function” to give the relation between theory and observations,
but later van Fraassen (1980, 64) defines a theory to be “empirically adequate if it
has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substruc-
tures of that model” (cf. van Fraassen 1991, 12).
Definition 5. A ce-theory


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for appearances A if
and only if there is some n ∈ N such that for every A ∈ A, there is an E ∈ En
with E∼=A.
2The notation for Tn is close to one often used in the philosophy of science, although it is
somewhat infelicitous. The precise notation would be Tn =


Tn ,{〈Pi ,PTni 〉 : i ∈ I }, etc.

3To be precise: If f : Tm −→ Tn is an isomorphism between Tm and Tn , then the set En of
empirical substructures that corresponds to Em contains all and only those structures E for which
there is an E′ ∈ En such that f is an isomorphism between E and E′.
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Definition 5 defines the empirical adequacy of a theory relative to a set of
appearances. In contradistinction, empirical adequacy simpliciter is defined as
empirical adequacy for the set of all appearances (cf. Monton and Mohler 2008,
§1.5).
Definition 5 relies on the standard notion of isomorphism (e. g., Hodges 1993,
5). Turney (1990, 430) notes that his definitions are “loosely based” on Bell and
Machover (1977, 161–168), but he defines the isomorphism of two relational struc-
tures as follows (Turney 1990, 430–431, my terminology):
Definition 6. Two relational structuresS andS′ are idiosyncratically isomorphic
if and only if S = 〈S,P1,P2, . . . ,Pk〉 and S′ = 〈S ′,P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′k〉 with ni -ary
relations Pi ,P ′i and there are bijections f : S −→ S ′ and g : {P1, . . . ,Pk} −→{P ′1, . . . ,P ′k} such that 〈u1, . . . , uni 〉 ∈ Pi⇔


f (u1), . . . , f (uni )
 ∈ g (Pi ).
In contradistinction, Bell and Machover (1977, 165) effectively assume that
the bijection g is determined to map Pi to P ′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k (which leads,
up to notational change, to the definition given by Hodges (1993)). Clearly, then,
more structures are idiosyncratically isomorphic than isomorphic to each other—
too many more, as one can see from the following example loosely inspired by
Halvorson (2012, 192). Let the ce-theory


Tn ,En

contain all Tn and En that ful-
fill the following conditions: Tn is a model of Θ = {∃>k x(x = x)} ∪ {∀x(Pk x→
Pi x) : 1 ≤ i < k} with a set of objects {ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1} ⊆ Tn with ai 6= a j
for i 6= j , and En contains the substructures Ein of Tn with domains E in = {ai}.

Tn ,En

makes the substantial claim about observable objects that when an ob-
ject has property Pk , it also has all properties P1, . . . ,Pk−1. But in Turney’s def-
inition,


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate given any class A of appearances with
singleton domains and properties P1, . . . ,Pk .
Proof. Take any appearanceA ∈A. 
Tn ,En contains the modelTn with Tn =N
and PTni = {i+1, . . . ,k+1} for 1≤ i ≤ k, and empirical substructures En = {Ein :
1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1} with E in = {i} and i ∈ P
Ein
j iff i > j . In A, the single object
a ∈ A has some number l of distinct properties: none for l = 0 and properties
Pi1 , . . . ,Pil for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. For each such l , A and El+1n are idiosyncratically
isomorphic because fl : A−→ E l+1n ,a 7→ l + 1, is trivially a bijection, so that A,
El+1n , fl and gl fulfill definition 6 when gl is chosen as follows. For l = 0, gl = id,
and for l > 0, gl is any bijection from {PA1 , . . . ,PAk } to {P
El+1n
1 , . . . ,P
El+1n
k
} with
gl : P
A
i j
7→ PEl+1nj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l . Hence every appearance in A is idiosyncratically
isomorphic to an empirical substructure of the same model Tn , and therefore

Tn ,En

would be empirically adequate given A under Turney’s definition.
It is for this reason that Turney’s definition is inadequate.
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3 Syntactic empirical adequacy
I now want to provide a syntactic description of the notion of a ce-theory and of
empirical adequacy. In a ce-theory, each element E ∈ En is uniquely determined
as the restriction Tn |E of Tn to E’s domain E . Thus for each Tn , En is deter-
mined by the set {E : E ∈ En}, and each ce-theory is completely determined by
its corresponding family, defined as follows:
Definition 7. Let


Tn ,En

be a ce-theory. Then its corresponding family of struc-
tures is given by {T∗n}n∈N with T∗n =


Tn ,P
Tn
i ,F
Tn
j , c
Tn
k
, ST
∗
n

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , where
ST
∗
n = {E :E ∈ En}.
{E :E ∈ En} is thus the extension of a predicate S of higher order, and for any
predicate P , SP is the claim that P has an empirical extension. If


Tn ,En

is a ce-
theory, its corresponding family can be described up to isomorphism by a set Θ
of higher order sentences or a class {Θi : m ∈ M} thereof, where {T∗n}n∈N is the
union of the models of each set Θm (Lutz 2014, §2).4 For a class to be necessary,
however, M or at least one Θm have to be infinite, for otherwise the correspond-
ing family would be the class of models of the single sentence
∨
m∈M
∧
Θm . I am
not aware of any scientific theory that would require an infinite M or Θm , and
it seems that for most scientific theories, even finite sets of sentences in higher
order logic suffice. For the typical mathematical structures needed in physics can
be defined by finite sets of higher order sentences (cf. Enderton 2009, §2, §4).
Nonetheless, I will first discuss ce-theories whose corresponding family can be
described by a single set of sentences and then discuss the general case.
Each appearance A ∈ A can be described up to isomorphism by a single set
of sentences ΦA. Of course, each A may have its own distinct domain A, so that
the sentences in ΦA must be taken as relativized to A. Using the symbol ‘EA’
as name for A, this leads to a set Φ(EA)
A
of relativized sentences.5 The set of all
appearances can then be described as the set of sentences

Φ(EA)
A
:A ∈A	∪{SEA :
A ∈ A}, containing the relativized descriptions of each appearance and for each
appearance’s domain EA the higher order sentence SEA stating that EA has an
empirical extension. Empirical adequacy then becomes semantic consistency:
Claim 1. Let {T∗n}n∈N be the family corresponding to ce-theory


Tn ,En

, and let
Θ describe {T∗n}n∈N up to isomorphism. Let each appearance A ∈A be described up
to isomorphism by ΦA. Then


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for A if and only if
Θ∪ Φ(EA)
A
:A ∈A	∪{SEA :A ∈A} (1)
is semantically consistent.
4If the ce-theory is formalized in the notation of Bell and Machover, the index set can be used
as a vocabulary (cf. Lutz 2014, §3).
5The relativization σ (EA) of a sentence σ consists of the restriction of all quantifiers in σ to EA
(cf. Hodges 1993, theorem 5.1.1). For any set Σ of formulas, Σ (EA) is the set of the relativizations
of the elements of Σ . Turney (1990, definition 13) calls relativizations ‘qualifications’.
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Proof. The set (1) is semantically consistent iff it has a model. This is the case
iff there is some model T∗n of Θ such that for each A ∈ A, T∗n  {SEA} ∪ Φ(EA)A .
Because ST
∗
m = {E : E ∈ En}, this holds iff EA is interpreted by the domain E
of some E ∈ En such that T∗n[EA/E]  Φ(EA)A . Since Φ(EA)A does not contain the
term S, this is the case iff Tn[EA/E]  Φ(EA)A . Induction on the complexity of
formulas shows that this holds iff E = Tn |E  ΦA,6 and thus, by assumption, iff
E is isomorphic to A. Therefore, the set (1) is semantically consistent iff there is
some n ∈N such that for each A ∈A, there is an E ∈ En with E∼=A.
If a ce-theory


Tn ,En

can be described by a set {Θm : m ∈ M} of sets of
sentences, claim 1 entails that


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate if and only ifΘm∪
Φ(EA)
A
:A ∈A	∪{SEA :A ∈A} is semantically consistent for at least one m ∈M .
The use of semantic consistency is not forbidden for syntactic approaches, since
their core assumption is not that semantic concepts cannot be used at all, but
rather that the description of theories has to be syntactical (cf. Lutz 2014, §5).
The syntactic description of empirical adequacy that is given in claim 1 differs
from the one given by Turney (1990, 446–447) in a number of respects. For ex-
ample, Turney assumes that a ce-theory is an elementary class that contains only
relational structures. The former arguably puts him at odds with van Fraassen
(1989, 211), while the latter requires elaborate reformulations of most scientific
theories, which typically contain constants and functions. Most importantly for
the following, Turney provides a syntactic reformulation of each concept of defi-
nition 5, but keeps its overall structure intact. Specifically, he does not provide a
single set of sentences that captures both the family of models and the family of
sets of empirical substructures of a ce-theory. For this reason, the possibility to
capture empirical adequacy in the rv is not obvious in his syntactic description.
4 Empirical adequacy in a bipartitioned vocabulary
Given that the empirical adequacy of a theory can be phrased syntactically in
a single vocabulary, it is very simple to capture empirical adequacy in the bi-
partitioned vocabulary of the rv. For this, one can simply treat the original vo-
cabulary as theoretical (T ) and introduce a second, observational term for each
theoretical one. Thus, for each Pi one can introduce an observational term P oi ,
and analogously for function and constant symbols, leading to an observational
vocabulary O . Let Φo be the set of sentences that results from exchanging each
non-logical constant in the set Φ of sentences by its observational counterpart.
Then the empirical adequacy of a ce-theory can be expressed as the compatibil-
ity of an rv-theory with the observations:
6For a quick plausibility consideration, note that Tn[EA/E]  Φ(EA)A ⇔ Tn[EA/E]|E 
Φ(EA)
A
⇔Tn[EA/E]|E  Φ(EA)A ∧∀xEAx⇔E=Tn |E  ΦA.
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Corollary 2. Let {T∗n}n∈N be the family corresponding to ce-theory


Tn ,En

, and
letΠ describe {T∗n}n∈N up to isomorphism. Let each appearanceA be described up to
isomorphism by ΦA. Then


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for A if and only if
Π ∪Γ ∪
n
Φ(EA)
A
o
:A ∈A
o
∪ SoE o
A
:A ∈A	 (2)
is semantically consistent, whereΓ = {P oi = Pi}i∈I∪{So = S}∪{F oj = F j } j∈J∪{c ok =
ck}k∈K .
Proof. The reducts of the models of Π ∪Γ to O are the models of Π with their
symbols renamed as described above. Hence the corollary follows from claim 1
by a simple renaming of symbols.
Corollary 2 establishes that empirical adequacy is nothing but the compati-
bility of an rv-theory consisting of theoretical postulates Π and correspondence
rules Γ (definition 1) with observation sentences (definition 2). As claim 1, corol-
lary 2 applies only to ce-theories whose corresponding family can be described
by a single set of higher order sentences. Again with the caveat that few if any
theories will require a description of their models by a class {Πm : m ∈M} of sets
of sentences, corollary 2 can be generalized for this case: The ce-theory is then
empirically adequate if and only if the setΠm∪Γ ∪
n
Φ(EA)
A
o
:A ∈A
o
∪SoE o
A
:
A ∈ A	 is semantically consistent for at least one m ∈ M . The use of semantic
consistency is not incompatible with the rv, since it is essentially the same as the
use of semantic entailment.
Corollary 2 is somewhat unsatisfying in that there is no difference between
theoretical and observational concepts except their names. This is not a problem
of the rv itself, but rather inherited from ce—which will become important in
§5. Nonetheless, there are some ways to provide the correspondence rules with a
somewhat more elaborate role, even within the confines of ce. In keeping with
Carnap’s hope that all observational terms can be defined in theoretical terms
and his almost universally accepted conjecture that the converse is not gener-
ally possible (Carnap 1966, 234), one can restrict the identification of theoretical
with observational terms to observable objects. For the relation symbols, the
correspondence rules then have the form
{∀x¯[P oi x¯↔∃Y (SY ∧Y x1 ∧ · · · ∧Y xmi )∧ Pi x¯] : i ∈ I } ∪ {So = S} , (3)
where mi is the arity of Pi and x¯ stands for a string of mi distinct variables.7
Things are not as straightforward for functions, since functions have to be de-
fined over the whole domain. One could thus substitute an n j + 1-ary observa-
tional relation Qoj for each n j -ary theoretical function F j with
∀x¯[Qoi x1 . . . xn j+1↔∃Y (SY ∧Y x1 ∧ · · · ∧Y xn j )∧ F j x1 . . . xn j = xn j+1] , (4)
7To the extent that his terse sketch allows a comparison, Friedman (1982, 276–277) seems to
have this kind of correspondence rule in mind.
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which would also mean that the descriptions

Φ(EA)
A
o
of the appearances have to
be changed accordingly. It is therefore more convenient to disappoint Carnap’s
hope for explicit definitions and rely for each F j on the conditional definition
∀x¯[∃Y (SY ∧Y x1 ∧ · · · ∧Y xn j )→ (F oj x¯ = F j x¯)] . (5)
However, since the value of the observational functions is irrelevant outside the
domains of the empirical substructures, the conditional definitions could be com-
pleted by conditionally defining that outside of the empirical subdomains, the
observational functions all have the same, arbitrarily chosen value.
For reasons that will be discussed in §5, observational constant symbols still
have to be identified with their theoretical counterparts, which leads to
Corollary 3. In corollary 2, Γ can also be the union of sets (3), (5), and {c o
k
= ck :
k ∈K}.
Proof. Since the modification does not change the extensions of the observa-
tional terms within any set that is in the extension of S, the corollary follows
immediately from corollary 2.
This, then, shows that van Fraassen’s and Turney’s conjecture about the im-
possibility of capturing empirical adequacy in the rv is incorrect. The use of
embeddings is thus not superior to the use of correspondence rules when con-
necting theory and observations. In fact, the ce-formalism is but a special case
of the rv-formalism, with specific restrictions on the form of observation sen-
tences, correspondence rules Γ , and postulates Π . In the next section, I will
argue that because of these restriction, the ce-formalism is actually inferior to
the rv-formalism.
5 Beyond empirical substructures
Definition 3 puts enormous restrictions on the formalization of theories. For
it follows from the definition of a substructure that every constant of a model
Tn of a ce-theory has to be in the domain E of each of its empirical substruc-
tures E ∈ En . Furthermore, every function of the model E ∈ En must map
all (tuples of) elements of E to elements of E (Hodges 1993, lemma 1.2.2). If
now a ce-theory


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate, every appearance A is isomor-
phic to some empirical substructure of some Tn , and since {Tn}n∈N is closed
under isomorphism, A is an empirical substructure of some Tn (Hodges 1993,
ex. 1.2.4b). Therefore Tn’s domain Tn contains observable objects, all constants
of Tn are observable objects, and all functions of Tn map observable objects to
other observable objects. If now the theory is about, say, elementary particles,
the observable objects are, for example, the results shown on the measurement
instruments or (parts of) the measurement instruments themselves. These then
9
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have to satisfy those formulas that the theory ascribes to elementary particles,
and all constants in the theory have to be results shown on measurement instru-
ments or, respectively, (parts of) measurement instruments.8
One may object to these criticisms on the grounds that the terms ‘embed-
ding’, ‘substructure’, and ‘isomorphism’ are not meant literally. However, the
terms are well-defined within, but not outside of model theory, where in general
they also do not occur together. And the objection makes van Fraassen use these
terms in different, undefined ways without pointing this out, and subsequently
helping himself to results from model theory without any justification. For ex-
ample, van Fraassen (1980, 43) discusses cases in which “every model of T1 can
be embedded in (identified with a substructure of) a model of T2.” The paren-
thetical equivalence claim relies on the model theoretic definition of ‘embedding’
and ‘substructure’, on the closure of the class of models of a ce-theory under iso-
morphism, and the equivalence of embedding and the substructure relation for
isomorphically closed classes of structures (Hodges 1993, ex. 1.2.4b). If the terms
were not meant in the model theoretic sense, there would be no justification for
this equivalence claim.
The problems resulting from van Fraassen’s reliance on substructures can eas-
ily be solved in the rv, because rv-theories can contain non-observational terms,
which themselves do not have to be connected directly to observations. Thus
even without loosening the restrictions on the observation sentences inherited
from ce, the rv allows for connections between arbitrarily complex theoretical
concepts with terms in T and simple observational concepts with terms in O ,
namely through postulates Π that introduce T -terms and correspondence rules
Γ that go beyond simple identification or identification in a restricted domain.
Hence in an rv-theory, there can be constant symbols in T for unobservable ob-
jects, and function symbols in T for functions from observable to unobservable
objects. The empirical adequacy of such a more general rv-theoryΠ∪Γ can still
be defined as the semantic consistency of the set (2) of sentences. This solution in
the rv no doubt has a counterpart in model theory, but it would in all likelihood
either require either a significant reformulation of most scientific theories before
they can be analyzed in the ce-formalism, or involve a generalization of the ce-
formalism.9 In the latter case the formalism would not be the one criticized here
and conjectured by van Fraassen to be superior to the rv-formalism.
8Essentially because of the Newman objection, this can formally always be arranged by defin-
ing appropriate relations, functions, and constants for the observable objects (assuming the right
cardinality of the empirical substructures’ and the appearances’ domains), but this would trivialize
empirical adequacy (cf. van Fraassen 2006); I am assuming here that the trivialization problem has
been solved.
9Indeed, I think substituting relativized reducts for substructures in definition 5 suffices for
avoiding the objections presented here.
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6 Beyond consistency
Corollary 2 allows a direct comparison of the rv and ce. Its relevance is demon-
strated by a previous comparison given by Muller (2010, 90), who, in line with
Carnap (1966, 240–241), states that one aim of scientific theories in the rv is obser-
vational adequacy (“ObsAdeq”), for which a theory must entail the observations
made so far. He points out three differences to empirical adequacy (“EmpAdeq”)
(Muller 2010, 90, n. 8):
( i) ObsAdeq relies on the distinction between theoretical and obser-
vational concepts whereas EmpAdeq does not [ . . . ]; ( ii) ObsAdeq
depends on historical time whereas EmpAdeq is timeless (quantifies
universally over historical times); (iii) EmpAdeq requires for its def-
inition a conception of a scientific theory that [ . . . ] cannot be de-
fined in the [rv ].
Corollary 2 shows that Muller’s claim (iii), which is again but a conjecture, is
false. It also shows that difference (i) is easily overcome by introducing an ob-
servational vocabulary and identity statements as correspondence rules. The dis-
cussion in §5 furthermore shows that this difference speaks in favor of the rv.
Difference (ii) is not one of principle, but at best one of primacy of definition:
One could define ‘preliminary empirical adequacy’ as ‘empirical adequacy given
the appearances A observed so far’, and define ‘eternal observational adequacy’
as ‘observational adequacy at all times’.
Muller misses the real difference, which is obvious in the syntactic para-
phrase: A theory is observationally adequate if it entails all observations, while it
is empirically adequate if it is not incompatible with them. Compared to observa-
tional adequacy, then, empirical significance is cheap: A tautology is compatible
with any set of sentences describing the appearances, and thus its set of models
is empirically adequate. This is obvious given claim 1, and can also be translated
into the ce-formalism: The ce-theory corresponding to a tautology contains the
class of all structures and for each structure the set of all its substructures as
empirical substructures. This ce-theory is empirically adequate given any appear-
ances A. Thus claim 1 throws doubt on van Fraassen’s claim that science “aims
to give us theories that are empirically adequate” (van Fraassen 1980, 12), at least if
empirical adequacy is meant to be the only aim of science, or even a particularly
interesting one.
This criticism has already been put forth by Worrall (1984, §3) and Percival
(2007, 87), who suggests as one of three possible replacements for van Fraassen’s
account of the aim of science that for each context c , science aims for theories
that are empirically adequate and “fully empirically informative with respect to
all the phenomena that are relevant at c” (Percival 2007, 87).10 Unfortunately,
Percival does not provide an explication of the latter notion in the ce-formalism,
10The other two possible replacements are outside the scope of this discussion.
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but rather stipulates that a theory “is ‘fully empirically informative’ with respect
to certain phenomena iff it expresses all true propositions that are solely about
those phenomena” (Percival 2007, n. 44). In his reply, van Fraassen (2007, §1.1)
acknowledges the need for informative theories, but does not give an explication
either.
To arrive at a precise notion of full empirical informativeness, one can look
to the rv. An rv-theory Θ expresses all and only true propositions about some
appearancesA if and only ifΘ  Φ(EA)
A
:A ∈A	∪{SEA :A ∈A}. For a ce-theory

Tn ,En

, then, every model T∗n of the corresponding family described by Θ is
also a model of the observations. It is not very difficult to see that this is the case
if and only if every empirical substructure E ∈ En of every structure in


Tn ,En

is isomorphic to an appearance A ∈A and, since every A ∈A is described up to
isomorphism, vice versa. Since this condition already entails empirical adequacy,
it formalizes the aim of science as suggested by Percival if context c is taken to
determine the appearances A.
7 Conclusion
The preceding discussion has brought out a number of points. First, the rv can de-
scribe scientific theories and their relation to the the observations if ce can, while
the opposite is not obviously the case. Second, the ce-formalism can and should
be extended in at least two respects. It should allow for concepts in theories that
do not also occur in the appearances and it should include the explication of ‘full
empirical informativeness’ among its formal desiderata for a ce-theory. Finally,
and as a suggestive corollary to this and previous discussions, the philosophy of
science would be better off if syntactic and semantic methods in general and the
rv and ce in particular were not seen as in opposition, but, correctly, as means
of mutual support and improvement.
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